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ABSTRACT
Voice User Interfaces (VUIs) are increasingly popular and built
into smartphones, home assistants, and Internet of Things (IoT)
devices. Despite offering an always-on convenient user experience,
VUIs raise new security and privacy concerns for their users. In
this paper, we focus on attribute inference attacks in the speech
domain, demonstrating the potential for an attacker to accurately
infer a target user’s sensitive and private attributes (e.g. their emo-
tion, sex, or health status) from deep acoustic models. To defend
against this class of attacks, we design, implement, and evaluate a
user-configurable, privacy-aware framework for optimizing speech-
related data sharing mechanisms. Our objective is to enable primary
tasks such as speech recognition and user identification, while re-
moving sensitive attributes in the raw speech data before sharing
it with a cloud service provider. We leverage disentangled represen-
tation learning to explicitly learn independent factors in the raw
data. Based on a user’s preferences, a supervision signal informs the
filtering out of invariant factors while retaining the factors reflected
in the selected preference. Our experimental evaluation over five
datasets shows that the proposed framework can effectively defend
against attribute inference attacks by reducing their success rates
to approximately that of guessing at random, while maintaining
accuracy in excess of 99% for the tasks of interest. We conclude that
negotiable privacy settings enabled by disentangled representations
can bring new opportunities for privacy-preserving applications.
CCS Concepts
• Embedded systems; • Voice-enabled; • Security and Pri-
vacy; • Performance and Utility;
Keywords
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1 INTRODUCTION
Voice-controlled IoT devices and smart home assistants have
gained huge popularity on our devices and in our households. Intu-
itive interaction between users and services is enabled by analyzing
speech signals. For example, smart assistants (e.g., Google Assis-
tant, Amazon Echo, and Apple Siri) and voice browsing (e.g., Google
Search) use Voice User Interfaces (VUIs) to activate the voice as-
sistant to control IoT devices or perform tasks such as browsing
the Internet and/or making recommendations. Figure 1 (A) shows
an overview of how these systems work. Although devices often
suffer from frequent false activations [17], it all begins with some
kind of trigger such as ‘Okay, Google’, ‘Alexa’, and ‘Hey, Siri’ to
inform the system that speech-based data will be received. Once
a voice stream is captured by a device, it outsources analysis to
cloud services such as automatic speech recognition (ASR), speaker
verification (SV), and natural language processing (NLP) where
higher performance is achievable. This frequently involves com-
municating instructions to other connected devices, appliances,
and third-party systems. Finally, text-to-speech services are often
employed in order to speak back to the user. Our voice signal is a
rich source of personal and sensitive data. It contains indicators of
a variety of emotions, physical and mental health and well-being,
etc., and thus raises unprecedented security and privacy concerns
where raw data is transmitted to third parties. The signal contains
linguistic and paralinguistic information such as age, gender, health
status, personality, friendliness, mood, and emotions [70].
Today, deep learning models are playing a pivotal role in speech
signal processing to enable natural and intuitive communication
with our smart devices. For example, recent end-to-end (E2E) auto-
matic speech recognition systems rely on autoencoder architecture
as a way of folding separate acoustic models, pronunciation, and
language models (AM, PM, LM) of a traditional ASR system into
a single neural network [11, 13, 26, 80], as shown in Figure 1 (B).
These models train by ingesting speech spectrograms as alternative
frequency-based representations for speech signals and generate
text transcriptions. The encoder encodes the input acoustic feature
sequence into a vector, which encapsulates the information for
its input to help the decoder in predicting the sequence of sym-
bols. Although these models have comparable performance with
conventional models [13], they have been designed without con-
sidering potential privacy vulnerabilities, given the need to train
on real voice data, which contains significant amount of sensitive
information.
Attribute inference attacks aim to reveal individuals’ sensitive
attributes (e.g. emotion, gender, health status, etc.) that they did not
intend to share. Several privacy violations may arise by obtaining
these sensitive data without individuals’ awareness or permission.
In this paper, we focus on an adversarial privacy leakage scenario of
deep representations for speech processing tasks. In particular, we
focus on the probability of inferring sensitive attributes using deep
acoustic models that perform different operations like speech to text
translation or speaker recognition. For example, an attacker may
use an acoustic model trained for speech recognition or speaker
verification to learn further sensitive attributes from user input
even if not present in its training data, as shown in Figure 1 (C).
The attacker may use the output of these models to train classifiers
to infer private attributes. We can measure an attack’s success as
the increase in inference accuracy over random guessing [83], and
we find that an attacker can achieve high accuracy in inferring sen-
sitive attributes, ranging from 40% to 99.4%, which is three or four
times better than guessing at random, depending on the acoustic
conditions of the input. We discuss this further in Section 6.1.
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Figure 1: (A) Voice-controlled Systems, (B) End-to-End Automatic Speech Recognition Systems, (C) Potential Attribute Infer-
ence Attacks
In order to limit the success of such attacks, we propose a user-
driven framework designed to offer a practical defense against
attribute inference attacks. A challenge in designing the proposed
framework to face such attacks is to consider individuals’ privacy
preferences in sharing their data. Precisely, different users may have
differing privacy preferences on the type of analytics can be done
on their data depending on the devices and services with which
they are interacting. For instance, when contacting a health service
provider, a user may prefer to share raw data without filtering it,
while a user may prefer to filter sensitive data when interacting
with advertising companies. To address this challenge, the proposed
framework works in two phases. In Phase I, the user adjusts their
privacy preference, where each of the preferences is associated with
a set of tasks (e.g. speech recognition) that can be performed on the
user data. In Phase II, we take advantage of learning disentangled
representation [78] in the observed data to explicitly drive each
dimension to reflect independent factors for a particular task.
Finally, we evaluate the proposed framework’s efficiency against
this class of attacks using various datasets, which were recorded
under different acoustic conditions (IEMOCAP [8], RAVDESS [47],
SAVEE [27], LibriSpeech [62], and VoxCeleb [58]) to simulate the
real-time environment in which voice recordings are collected.
The results show the effectiveness of our proposed framework in
reducing the success rate of the attacker to less than or equal to
randomly guessing for identifying sensitive attributes.
Contribution. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We show the vulnerability of underlying acoustic models
used by speech processing tasks under attribute inference
attack scenarios. Models’ predictions may exploit such mod-
els to learn further information about users. We measure the
success of these attacks by the increase in inference accuracy
over random guessing. We demonstrate the importance of
developing privacy-preserving solutions that can run at the
edge, i.e. before sharing data with service providers.
• We propose and develop a privacy-aware, configurable de-
fence framework against attribute inference attacks. We de-
sign it to include users’ privacy preferences in managing the
privacy-utility trade-off inherent in data sharing. Precisely,
we allow a user to explicitly adjust the disentangled represen-
tation of his/her preference, learned by the framework from
his/her data. According to our experimental results, we con-
clude that the controllability enabled by the disentanglement
may define a new direction in developing privacy-preserving
applications that satisfy the transparency principle.
• We experimentally evaluate the proposed framework over
various datasets, and the results show the effectiveness of
the proposed framework in confronting this type of attack
by filtering the sensitive attributes while maintaining high
accuracy, i.e. >99%, for the tasks of interest (Audio snippets
are available via the link in the footnote1, and our code will
be available open source upon this paper’s acceptance.).
The paper is organized into nine sections. Following this intro-
duction, we provide a general background about disentanglement
in Section 2 and formulate the problem description in Section 3.
The proposed defense framework is given in Section 4. Section 5
presents the experimental settings and the attribute inference at-
tack models. We evaluate the experimental results in Section 6,
and provide discussion and highlight directions for future work in
Section 7. We discuss related work in Section 8 prior to concluding
with Section 9.
1https://tinyurl.com/y932f37m
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2 DISENTANGLEMENT
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the necessary
technical background about disentanglement and its models.
2.1 Learning Disentangled Representation
There has been notable recent interest in learning disentan-
gled representations in various domains, such as computer vi-
sion [25], ML fairness [53, 68], and domain adaptation [64, 77],
as they promise to enhance robustness, interpretability, and gen-
eralization to unseen examples on downstream tasks. The overall
goal of disentangling is to improve the quality of the latent rep-
resentations by explicitly separating the underlying factors of the
observed data [38]. For example, in computer vision, there is a
variety of tasks that have benefited from disentangled represen-
tations like pose-invariant recognition [67], attribute transfer via
adversarial disentanglement [86], and person re-identification [20].
There is an extended trend towards learning disentangled rep-
resentations in the speech domain. Speech signal simultaneously
encodes linguistically relevant information, e.g. phoneme and lin-
guistically irrelevant information like speaker characteristics. In
the case of speech processing, an ideal disentangled representa-
tion would be able to separate fine-grained factors [22] such as
speaker identity, noise, recording channels, and prosody, as well as
the linguistic content. Thus, disentanglement will allow learning
of salient and robust representations from the speech that are es-
sential for applications including speech recognition [63], prosody
transfer [76, 85], speaker verification [65], speech synthesis [31, 76],
and voice conversion [32], among other applications.
2.2 Disentanglement Models
Most prior works on disentangled representation learning are
based on well-established frameworks, such as variational autoen-
coders (VAEs) [40] and generative adversarial models (GANs) [23]
in learning disentangled and hierarchical representations. They are
based on the original objective of these models and derive regular-
izations to strengthen the disentanglement to learn compact and
meaningful representations. These works can be categorized into
three groups according to the model that depend on: VAE-based
models [28, 42, 43], GAN-based models [12, 14, 39], and combina-
tions of AE’s and GAN’s [19, 46, 51]. While extensive progress was
made by these prior works in the computer vision domain, little
has been done for speech processing.
Learning speech representations that are invariant to variabil-
ities in speakers, language, environments, microphones, etc., are
incredibly challenging to capture [45]. To address this challenge,
various variants of VAEs have recently been proposed in learning
robust disentangled representation due to their generative nature
and distribution learning abilities. Hsu et al. in [30] propose the
Factorized Hierarchical VAE (FHVAE) model to learn hierarchical
representation in sequential data such as speech at different time
scales. Their model aims to separate between sequence-level and
segment-level attributes to capture multi-scale factors in an unsu-
pervised manner. Similarly, Predictive Aux-VAE [75] was proposed
to obtain speech representations at different timescales by disentan-
gling local (content) from global (speaker) information inherently.
Although the focus of these works is to raise the efficiency and
effectiveness of speech processing applications (e.g. speech recog-
nition, speaker verification, and language translation), in this paper
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Figure 2: Theworkflowof the proposed framework: it serves
as a filter between the edge and the cloud to purify data com-
ing from source node based on an auxiliary user preference
we highlight the benefit of learning disentangled representation to
learn privacy-preserving speech representations, as well as show-
ing how disentanglement can be useful in transparently protecting
user privacy.
3 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we present our threat model and explain the
goals of the user, the potential attribute inference attacker, and the
defender in this context.
3.1 User
Honest data owners provide information to cloud service providers
to maximize their utility, but under the assumptions that the sen-
sitive information in their shared data should be protected. They
agree on the use of data for a target task, while they do not con-
sent to the performance of additional analysis on their data that
may violate their privacy. In the voice control scenario, while users
(data owners) may agree to share their voice recordings for speech
recognition and accurate execution of their command, they might
want to protect their sensitive information (e.g., emotion or health
status) such that no secondary inferences are made from the data.
For example, Amazon has patented the technology to analyze users’
voices to determine their emotions and/or mental health condi-
tions. This allows understanding speaker commands and responses
according to their feeling to provide highly targeted content [35].
3.2 Attacker
Our attack aims to correctly infer sensitive attributes (e.g., gender,
emotion, and health status) about data owners by exploiting a sec-
ondary use of the same data collected for the main task. Specifically,
the attacker could be any party (e.g., a service provider, advertiser,
data broker, or a surveillance agency) which has interest in data
owners’ sensitive attributes. The service providers could use these
attributes for targeting content; or data brokers might profit from
selling these information to other parties such as advertisers and
insurance companies, and surveillance agencies may use these at-
tributes to recognize users and track their activities and behaviour.
In this paper, we focus on the following question: to what extent
can such an attacker infer data owners’ sensitive attributes which
they prefer not to share, and to what extent can this be prevented.
To answer this, we assume that the attacker has white-box knowl-
edge (i.e. parameters and target model architecture) and a machine
learning classifier that uses data owners’ data as input to train the
classifier and predict data owners’ sensitive attributes.
3
3.3 Defender
The goal of the privacy-preserving framework in this paper is to
protect the sensitive attributes of data shared from the potential at-
tribute inference attacks launched by a curious attacker.We propose
a privacy-aware defense framework controlled by the data owner
to filter the raw data at the edge before sharing it with cloud service
providers, as shown in Figure 2. The proposed framework works
as a bridge between the data owners and the service providers
to allow privacy-preserving communication between them. This
framework receives the raw data as well as user preferences as
auxiliary information, then it uses the user preference to filter out
sensitive attributes they want to protect, which would be otherwise
contained in their shared data.
In Algorithm 1, we present the overall workflow of the pro-
posed framework to reconstruct the filtered data x¯ using learn-
ing disentangled representation. We call the proposed framework
Dual-phase Disentangled Filter (DDF). Firstly, the DDF receives the
inputs, which are raw data x , as well as user privacy preferences
P within one of the options provided by the DDF. These are high,
moderate, and low. These options are adjustable according to user
preference, which may change for differing application domains,
service contexts, etc. A privacy preference P is associated with the
set of tasks, resulting in a list of tasks that can be performed on the
raw data x . Phase II begins by checking the contents of the privacy
preference P list. In the case that it is empty, the user prefers to
share his/her data without filtering it. Otherwise, the raw data x
along with privacy preference P list will be passed to the disen-
tangle module, which starts different branches, and each branch
attempts to learn independent information related to a specific task.
After the disentanglement, the decoder D reconstructs the filtered
data x¯ by receiving the concatenation of the output of the desired
branches.
4 DUAL-PHASE DISENTANGLED FILTER
In this section, we describe our approach to include user pri-
vacy preferences in the filtering process by learning disentangled
representation.
4.1 Overview
We focus on the setting where the users’ preferences serve as
a control signal over a utility-privacy optimization problem. The
users’ inclusion can enable them to manage their information flow
and potentially make better decisions on sharing their data to re-
duce privacy concerns. However, the major challenge to adjust this
setting is how to learn disentangled and robust representations
from the users’ input that reflect their privacy preference. To tackle
this challenge, we propose a DDF framework that builds upon
VAEs [40] to encourage learning these disentangled latent repre-
sentations and then using users’ preferences to filter out unwanted
representations. Inspired by recommender systems, giving users
explicit control over the filtering process can enhance explainability
and transparency in sharing their data.
In Phase I (Optimization), we categorize users’ preferences into
i options Pi , which may be based on the application domain (e.g.
audio analysis). For each option Pi , there exists a set of tasksTi that
are associated with it. More clearly, when specifying a preference
option Pi , the tasks associated with this preference will achieve
high accuracy, while the rest of the tasks may have low accuracy.
Algorithm 1: Dual-phase Disentangled Filter
Input :Raw data x, Privacy preference P
Output :Filtered data x¯
1 initialization;
2 Function UserPreference():
// set the mode
3 for i ← 1 tom do
4 P ← { [t1; t2; ... ; ti ]: task i belong to preference p }
5 return P
6 Function Encoder(x):
7 z ← f nn (x )
8 return z
9 Function Disentangle(x , P):
// for each task ti in P
10 for i ← 1 tom do
// disentangled branch
11 z ← Encoder(x)
12 Bi ← f nn (z)
13 z¯ ← [B1; B2; ... ; Bi ] // concatenate
14 return z¯
15 Function Decoder(z¯):
16 x¯ ← f nn (z¯)
17 return x¯
18 P ← UserPreference()
19 if P not Empty then
20 z¯ ← Disentangle(x , P )
21 x¯ ← Decoder(z¯)
22 else
23 x¯ = x
24 return x¯
The relation between the preference option Pi and the task Ti is
denoted by yp,t ∈ {0, 1}, where yp,t = 1 indicates that preference
explicitly adopts task i , whereas yp,t= 0 means there is no relation
between the two.
In Phase II (Filtering), by leveraging the information-theoretic
interpretation of VAEs, we propose an autoencoder architecture
with a disentangle module to explicitly decouple the distinct fac-
tors in the raw data. Firstly, the disentangle R, which is the key
module in the proposed framework, receives a user’s raw data x
and privacy preference Pi . Based on the preferred option, the dis-
entangle R starts a particular branch for each task Bt . Each branch
Bt aims to learn task-specific representations rt,s , while ignoring
task-invariant representations rt,i . Then, the branches’ outputs
of the target tasks are concatenated to form a disentangle R out-
put z¯. Finally, the Decoder D uses the disentangle R output z¯ to
reconstruct the filtered data x¯ .
4.2 DDF for Speech Representation
Leveraging the multi-scale nature of sequences such as speech,
text, and video, distinct factors can be captured at different timescales
[30]. For example, in speech signals the phonetic content affects the
segment level, while the speaker characteristic affects the sequence
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used as a control signal to extract the corresponding repre-
sentations and reconstruct the output (right)
level. Thus, the speech signal can be disentangled into several
independent factors, each of which carries a different type of infor-
mation. In our context, the idea is to disentangle the factors related
to the task we want to compute. We aim to demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of learning disentangled representation in preserving the
sensitive attributes in the user data. Besides, this disentanglement
can also be beneficial to promote transparency in protecting users’
privacy. Figure 3 presents our use of the disentangled representation
to enable users’ control over the data they want to share.
4.2.1 Phase IWe consider three preference options: high Ph , mod-
erate Pm and low Pl . We also suppose there are threemain tasks that
can be performed on the user data: speech recognition T1, speaker
verification T2, and others (i.e. emotion and gender recognition)
T3. For each option Pi , we associate a set of tasks Ti . For example,
when a user specifies a preference option Ph , the user’s raw data x
will be used for theT1, while the rest of the tasksT2 andT3 will get
mistaken results. As the relation between the preference option Pi
and the task Ti is denoted by yp,t ∈ {0, 1}, then yh,1 = 1, whereas
yh,2 and yh,3 = 0. Similarly, when the user selects a preference
option Pm , then ym,1 and ym,2 = 1, whereas ym,3 = 0. For the last
preference option Pl , yl,1 = yl,2 = yl,3 = 0, which means no filter
operation will be done over the user’s raw data x .
4.2.2 Phase II Intuitively, autoencoders use an encoding network
to extract a latent representation, which then passes through a
decoding network to recover the original data. Autoencoders are
trained to minimize the reconstruction error between the encoded-
decoded data and the raw data. VAE is an autoencoder whose en-
codings distribution is regularized during training to ensure that
its latent space captures useful representation to allow generating
powerful new data. VAE consists of the following main parts: an
encoder network for modelling a posterior distribution q(z|x) of
discrete latent random variables z given the input data x, a prior
distribution p(z), and a decoder with a distribution p(x |z) over the
input data. VAEloss decomposes into reconstruction loss of stan-
dard autoencoder and Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between
the prior p(z) and the posterior distribution q(z|x). The joint min-
imization of both losses leads to reasonable reconstruction while
reducing the latent space dimension at the same time.
In the speech domain, there are different variations of VAE that
aim to learn disentangled representation [30, 76] to allow disentan-
gling and controlling different attributes within the speech signal
such as speech content, speaker identity, and emotion. Thus, to
achieve our goal in learning disentangled representation for privacy
preservation purpose, we use different methods to obtain these
representation. Details about the implementation of each module
are as follows:
Disentangle R We intend to disentangle speech representations
from the input speech explicitly into several factors that can be used
independently for different tasks. To achieve this, we divide the
disentangle module into separate branches to force learning diverse
types of information [54]. We use a combination of objectives to
encourage these different branches to learn task-related factors.
Assuming we have two basic tasks, speech recognition and speaker
verification, that we want to maintain, we have two branches to
learn independent factors for each.
Branch 1 (Bspeech−r ecoдnition )
Inspired by Vector Quantized VAE (VQ-VAE) in [78], we perform
vector quantization to extract the phonetic content while being
invariant to low-level information. VQ-VAE model aims to produce
discrete latent space using Vector Quantization (VQ) techniques.
During the forward pass, the output of the encoder ze (x) is mapped
to the closest entry ci in a discrete codebook of c = [c1,c2,..,ck ].
Precisely, VQ-VAE finds the nearest codebook using Eq.1 and uses
it as the quantized representation zq (x) = cq (x) which is passed to
the decoder as content information.
q(x) = arдmini ∥ze (x) − ci ∥22 (1)
The transition from ze (x) to zq (x) does not allow gradient backprop-
agation due to the argmin function, but uses a straight-through
estimator [6]. VQ-VAE is trained using a sum of three-loss terms
(in Eq.2): the negative log-likelihood of the reconstruction, which
uses the straight-through estimator to bring the gradient from the
decoder to the encoder, and two VQ-related terms - the distance
from each prototype to its assigned vectors and the commitment
cost [78].
L = logp(x |zq (x)) +
sд[ze (x)] − cq (x)22 + β ze (x) − sд[cq (x)]22
(2)
sg(·) denotes the stop-gradient operation that zeros the gradient
with respect to its argument during backward pass.
By using vector quantization as a regularizer, the encoder in this
branch is encouraged to extract content-specific representations
and discard the invariant representations that the decoder can infer
from the information of the other branch for reconstruction pur-
poses. Alternatively, we can use the output of this branch as speech
embedding to train models that use these discrete representations
directly to translate from speech to text instead of reconstruction,
which may cause a significant improvement in privacy protection
in sharing speech data, as shown in Figure 3. For example, similar
to VQ-VAE [78], vq-wav2vec was proposed by [5] to quantize the
dense representations from the speech segments by implementing
either a Gumbel-Softmax or online k-means clustering. Then, they
apply well-performing NLP algorithms (e.g. BERT) to these quan-
tized representations and they present promising state-of-the-art
results in phoneme classification and speech recognition.
Branch 2 (Bspeaker−ver if ication )
Obtaining a good speaker representation becomes particularly im-
portant in speaker recognition, speaker adaptation, and more other
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applications, where irrelevant information of the signal should be
filtered out. Although speaker recognition systems can vary widely
in their design, they share the same objective in finding discrimina-
tive representations to maintain high accuracy and robustness in a
variety of environments.
The goal of this branch is to learn such speaker representations
that preserve user identity. To achieve this, we use two different
methods to extract these representations. Firstly, we use a one-hot
speaker code [29] to extract the speaker’s representations and then
use this code as a global condition for the decoder to reconstruct
the speech signal. Alternatively, we use Thin ResNet-34 [82] trained
using the angular variant learning metric [15] to encourage learn-
ing discriminative representation. The encoder in this branch will
encourage the extraction of speaker-specific representations and
discard invariant representations the decoder can infer from infor-
mation of the other branch for reconstruction. To support our goal
of enhancing privacy protection in sharing speech data, we want
to point out that the output of this branch can be used indepen-
dently as a speaker embedding, as shown in Figure 3 for speaker
verification application instead of reconstructing.
DecoderD In the speech domain, a vocoder learns to reconstruct
audio waveforms from acoustic features [61], as shown in 4. Tra-
ditionally, the waveform can be vocoded from these acoustic or
linguistic features using handcrafted models such as WORLD [56],
Straight [37], and Griffin-Lim [24]. However, the quality of those
traditional vocoders was limited by the difficulty in accurately esti-
mating the acoustic features from the speech signal.
Neural vocoders such as Wavenet [61] have rapidly become
the most commonly used vocoding method for speech synthesis.
Although it improved the quality of generated speech, it has signif-
icant cost in computation power and data sources, and suffers from
poor generalization [49]. To solve this problem, many architectures
such as Wave Recurrent Neural Networks (WaveRNN) [36] have
been proposed. WaveRNN combines linear prediction with recur-
rent neural networks to synthesize neural audio much faster than
other neural synthesizers. In our framework, we use WaveRNN as a
decoder with a minor change suggested by [49]. The autoregressive
component consists of a single forward GRU (hidden size of 896)
and a pair of affine layers followed by a softmax layer with 1024 out-
puts, predicting the 10-bit mu-law samples for a 24 kHz sampling
rate. The conditioning network consists of a pair of bi-directional
gated recurrent units (GRUs) with a hidden size of 128. The autore-
gressive component captures the content, while the conditioning
component represents the speaker’s characteristics. To achieve our
goal of preserving privacy, the quality of generated speech is mea-
sured by the extent to which it contains the desired information
after the filtering process and removing invariant information.
In general, Phase II is designed by taking advantage of the dis-
entanglement in learning independent representations from the
input, and then Phase I output is used to determine the outputs of
the proposed framework. More clearly, Phase II is intended to ac-
commodate possible preferences assuming that the input is passed
on several branches to learn different information according to the
specific task of the branch.
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the output (WaveRNN [36])
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe the datasets, inference attack models,
and proposed framework settings. We conduct our experiments on
a Z8 G4 workstation with Intel (R) Xeon (R) Gold 6148 (2.8 GHz)
CPU and 256 GB RAM. The operating system is Ubuntu 18.04. We
train all the models using PyTorch [1] on an NVIDIA Quadro RTX
5000 GPU.
5.1 Datasets
We use five real-world datasets recorded for various purposes
such as speech recognition, speaker recognition, and emotion recog-
nition. The details of each dataset are as follows:
IEMOCAP. The Interactive Emotional Dyadic Motion Capture
dataset [8] has 12 hours of audio-visual data from 10 actors where
the recordings follow dialogues between a male and a female actor
in both scripted or improvised topics in the English language. The
data was segmented by speaker turn, resulting in 5,255 scripted
recordings and 4,784 improvised recordings. It was mainly recorded
to facilitate the development of multimodal emotion recognition
systems. We use the scripted recordings that were labeled with four
emotions: anger, happy, sad, and neutral.
RAVDESS.The RyersonAudio-Visual Database of Emotional Speech
and Song [47] contains 1,440 recording for 24 actors (12 male and
12 female), vocalizing two lexically-matched statements in a neutral
North American accent. It was recorded to facilitate the develop-
ment of multimodal emotion recognition systems. It includes seven
emotions: calm, happy, sad, angry, fearful, surprise, and disgust, as
well as neutral expression. We use the entire dataset.
SAVEE. Surrey Audio-Visual Expressed Emotion database [27]. It
consists of phonetically-balanced sentences from standard TIMIT
(acoustic-phonetic continuous speech dataset) uttered by four Eng-
lish actors with a total size of 480 utterances. Mainly, it was recorded
to facilitate the development of multimodal emotion recognition
systems. It contains expressions of seven emotions: calm, happy,
sad, angry, fearful, surprise, and disgust, as well as neutral. We use
the entire dataset.
LibriSpeech. LibriSpeech [62] is a large dataset of approximately
1,000 hours of reading of English. It was derived from reading au-
diobooks from the LibriVox project, and was recorded to facilitate
the development of automatic speech recognition systems. We use
the train-clean100 set.
VoxCeleb. The VoxCeleb dataset [58] contains over 100,000 ut-
terances for 1,251 celebrities, extracted from videos uploaded to
YouTube. It was curated to facilitate the development of automatic
speaker recognition systems. We use the VoxCeleb2 subset of about
1,200 recordings.
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Training and Testing. For each dataset, we divide it 80% for train-
ing and 20% for testing.
5.2 Attribute Inference Attacks
An attribute inference attack aims to infer sensitive information
from users’ recordings. Specifically, an attacker trains a particu-
lar classifier that takes the representation extracted from users’
recordings as input and infers sensitive attributes (e.g., emotion
and gender).
5.2.1 Target Attributes.For IEMOCAP and RAVDESS, we consider
inference tasks are emotion recognition and binary gender at-
tributes, and train separate models to classify emotion and gender
recognition for the entire representation (after extracting these
representations from the raw recording) for each dataset. For Lib-
riSpeech and VoxCeleb, we consider the inference task to be gender,
and we train separate models to classify gender for the entire rep-
resentation for each dataset. For SAVEE, as it contains one gender,
we only consider the emotion inference. We repeat this setting for
each type of attacker classifier (35 models in total).
5.2.2 Models.Below are the details for each attack classifier:
Logistic Regression (LR): LR is a machine learning classifi-
cation algorithm used to predict the probability of a categorical
dependent variable. For binary classification such as gender recog-
nition, we use a sigmoid function to predict the true label, i.e. male
or female based on a given representation. For multiclass prediction,
we use the softmax function instead of the sigmoid function to nor-
malize the input values from all classes between 0 and 1 and return
the probabilities of each class. All models train using a stochastic
average gradient (SAG) and for 300 iterations. In this attack, the
attacker uses a LR classifier to perform attribute inference attacks.
Random Forest (RF): RF is a machine learning classification
algorithm that creates decision trees on randomly selected data
samples, gets a prediction from each tree, and selects the best solu-
tion by the means of voting. All models implement 100 estimators,
which indicates the number of trees in the forest. In this attack, the
attacker uses a RF classifier to perform attribute inference attacks.
Support Vector Machine (SVM): SVM is a discriminative clas-
sifier to find a hyperplane in N-dimensional space (N: features
numbers) that accurately classifies the data points. All models im-
plement a radial basis function (RBF) as a kernel function to scale
properly on large numbers of features in the input space, and scale
gamma distribution. In this attack, the attacker uses SVM classifier
to perform attribute inference attacks.
NeuralNetwork (NN)-Multilayer Perceptron (MLP): In this
attack, the attacker uses a three-layer fully connected neural net-
work (input layer, a hidden layer which has 2048 neurons, and
output layer) to perform attribute inference attacks. All models
adopt the rectified linear unit (ReLU) as an activation function.
They train by using Adam optimizer with learning rate = 0.001 and
batch size = 200 for 300 iterations. As it is difficult to determine the
possible structure of NNs, we chose a simple structure expected
to be enough to analyze the captured information in extracted
representations.
5.2.3 Setup. In advance of training these models, we must first
extract the representations from various datasets using pre-trained
acoustic models for speech recognition tasks. We extract the rep-
resentations from raw audio in different datasets using wav2vec
model [69], which achieves 2.43 % word error rate (WER) for speech
recognition. The wav2vec relies on a fully convolutional architec-
ture by applying two networks. The encoder network embeds the
audio signal in a latent space and the context network combines
multiple time-steps of the encoder to obtain contextualized rep-
resentations. We use the pre-training model on the full 960-hour
Librispeech training set with 32.5M parameters. To achieve our
purpose of obtaining similar representations to those which may be
used in acoustic models, we used only the output from the encoder
network. The encoder layers have kernel sizes (10, 8, 4, 4, 4) and
strides (5, 4, 2, 2, 2). The output of the encoder is a low-frequency
feature representation zi ∈ Z that encodes about 30 ms of 16 kHz of
raw audio and the striding results in representations zi every 10 ms.
We then used these representations to train attacker classifiers.
We also extract the speech representation using another state-of-
the-art model, DeepSpeech2 [3], which reported a 6.71% WER. It
consists of eleven layers including many bidirectional recurrent
and convolutional layers. The model was trained using the CTC
loss function and with a Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) and
Momentum optimizer which was extended with the Layer-wise
Adaptive Rate Clipping (LARC) algorithm. We use the pre-trained
model to extract the feature representation zi ∈ Z from the log-
spectrogram of the raw audio waveform signal. Then we used these
representations to train attacker classifiers.
5.3 Dual-phase Disentangled Filter Setting
Firstly, spectrograms are generated from the raw time-domain
waveform sampled at 16 kHz in a sliding window fashion using a
Hamming window of width 25 ms and step 10 ms. For the speech
embedding branch, these spectrograms are encoded by the encoder
which consists of five residual convnet layers (using 768 units
and ReLU activation). Then, the encoder output (latent vectors)
passes through vector quantization (512 codebook size) to become
a sequence of quantized representation that serves as the speech
embedding. For the speaker embedding branch, the generated spec-
trograms are used as input for the encoder (Thin ResNet-34 [82])
which the same as the original ResNet with 34 layers, except cut-
ting down the number of channels in each residual block to reduce
computational cost. Then, Self-attentive pooling (SAP) [9] is used
to aggregate frame-level features into the utterance-level repre-
sentation that serves as speaker embedding. The representations
from different branches are then upsampled and concatenated to
form the conditioning input to the WaveRNN decoder (Note: a
one-hot vector representing the speaker can be used as a global
condition of WaveRNN decoder). We train the proposed framework
on LibriSpeech, which has multiple speakers and was recorded at
a sampling rate of 16 kHz. We used the Adam optimizer with an
initial learning rate 4e-4 and evaluate the performance after 250,000
steps with batch size 64 (600,000 steps in total).
6 EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate our results in terms of (i) the effective-
ness of the attributes inference attacks in voice processing using
different model architectures and several datasets; and (ii) the effi-
ciency of the proposed framework to defend against this class of
attacks in the voice domain.
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Table 1: Accuracy of attribute inference attack using different acousticmodels to extract the representation (G=gender (binary);
E=emotion)
wav2vec Model DeepSpeech2 Model
Attacker
Model
LibriSpeech VoxCeleb SAVEE IEMOCAP RAVDESS LibriSpeech VoxCeleb SAVEE IEMOCAP RAVDESS
G(%) G(%) E(%) G(%) E(%) G(%) E(%) G(%) G(%) E(%) G(%) E(%) G(%) E(%)
LR 85.8 90.4 62.2 82.9 56.4 99.4 74.4 60 78.3 53.1 58.8 47.7 93 57.2
RF 86.7 80.8 43.2 86.4 55 95.6 61.9 50.7 63.5 42.2 62 50.1 86 53.5
MLP 75.8 78.8 39 76.4 51.2 93.8 64.4 56.7 57.8 40.5 58.4 45.3 95.3 63.2
SVM 76.7 85.6 55.7 85 57.9 94.4 60.2 66.7 73.9 46.2 54.3 55.6 88.4 61
6.1 Attack Effectiveness
6.1.1 Inference Accuracy.Since the attacker’s goal is to infer the
target attribute, we evaluate an attack using the inference accuracy
of the classifier used by the attacker. Precisely, we mean the accu-
racy of the classifier to infer sensitive information from the test set
over the probability of the random guessing. Assuming, for exam-
ple, that the sensitive attribute in question is the user’s emotion,
we have seven labelled categories in the available datasets (Ravdess
and SAVEE). The random guess rate for success is therefore around
14%. If we assume that the sensitive attribute is ‘gender’ (e.g. binary
male or female), the random guess rate will be 50%. As the models
potentially available to the attacker are unknown to us, we measure
the success accuracy of various models to infer the target attribute
trained on various datasets.
From Table 1, we see that the inference models have varying
performance, ranging from about 40% to 99.4% in successfully in-
ferring different attributes (e.g. emotion and gender). This means
that the inference attacks can improve success accuracy to three or
four times better than making a random guess. The difference be-
tween these percentages reflects the extent to which the attributes
relate to each other. For example, gender is more entangled with a
speaker’s identity than emotion, thus the attacker’s success rate is
higher in identifying speaker gender. Table 3 shows that although
there is a reduction in the success rate of an attacker in identity
speaker gender, still there is a slight increase over random guessing
in some cases.
Moreover, the diversity in the datasets recorded in different
environmental conditions and for diverse purposes may mimic
the differences in the real-time environments for the deployment
of voice-controlled devices. We notice that this diversity affects
the attack success accuracy; shown in Table 1. For example, an at-
tacker’s success accuracy to infer emotion attribute is varied among
the three emotional datasets ( IEMOCAP, RAVDESS, and SAVEE),
and the inference accuracy over RAVDESS is better than the other
datasets due to the good quality of the emotional recordings. Despite
these differences, we demonstrate that the deep acoustic models
can be exposed to sensitive attributes extraction from their inputs.
6.1.2 Impact of Acoustic Model Architecture on Attack Success.We
observe that the difference in the architecture of acoustic models
can help attackers to successfully achieve their objectives. Inso-
far as the accuracy in extracting deep representations is increased
to raise the efficiency of the speech processing tasks, the success
percentage in inference of sensitive representations will also in-
crease. For example, wav2vec [69] has been developed to extract
more powerful representations for speech recognition compared
to the DeepSpeech2 [3] model. From Table 1 we can see that the
Table 2: Speech recognition and speaker verification mea-
surements for voices generated by the proposed framework
with different privacy settings
Generated
(Hide Identity)
Generated
(Preserve Identity)
Dataset WER (%) EER (%) WER (%) EER (%)
LibriSpeech 1.16 N/A 0.32 0.03
VoxCeleb 0.80 N/A 0.13 0.0
IEMOCAP 0.86 N/A 0.29 0.07
RAVDESS 0.63 N/A 0.14 0.0
SAVEE 0.66 N/A 0.20 0.01
extracted representation using wav2vec increases the probability
of the attacker inferring sensitive attributes compared with the
DeepSpeech2 model.
6.2 Defense Efficiency
6.2.1 Disentanglement and Controllability.We aim to enable users
to have control over their data by taking advantage of disentangled
representation learning. Thus, we design and implement the pro-
posed framework on the assumption that there are three privacy
preferences options, namely high, moderate, and low. After train-
ing the proposed framework to explicitly learn the disentangled
representation from the speech data, it can generate different out-
puts that reflect the selected privacy preferences. Setting the ‘high’
option, speech content representation will be disentangled from
the speaker’s identity.
The proposed framework can generate two types of output, either
speech embedding or reconstruction of speech by concatenating
the speech embedding with a synthetic identity. For the moderate
option, the proposed framework can generate three types of outputs,
which are speech embedding, speaker embedding, or reconstruction
of speech by preserving the identity of the speaker while filtering
out other information (e.g, emotions). Finally, by selecting the ‘low’
option, the proposed framework will send the raw data without
any filtering. Figure 5 shows the spectrogram of the reconstructed
speech signal for the different options. Moreover, we use word error
rate (WER), a commonmetric of speech recognition performance, to
use the difference in the word level between two spoken sequences
to measure the difference in speech recognition between the raw
speech signal and the reconstructed one for the different privacy
preference options. We find, as shown in Table 2, that there is an
insignificant decrease in (∼1%) in speech recognition accuracy. We
use the equal error rate (EER) to measure the speaker verification
accuracy (for the moderate privacy preference), and we find that an
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Table 3: Success accuracy in inferring the sex attribute after implementing the DDF framework with moderate privacy prefer-
ence option (W2V: wav2vector model, DS: DeepSpeech2 model, Rec.: reconstructed speech)
LibriSpeech (%) VoxCeleb (%) IEMOCAP (%) RAVDESS (%)
Attack
Model
Raw
(w2v)
Raw
(DS) Rec.
Raw
(w2v)
Raw
(DS) Rec.
Raw
(w2v)
Raw
(DS) Rec.
Raw
(w2v)
Raw
(DS) Rec.
LR 85.8 60 53.8 90.4 78.3 57.1 82.9 58.8 55.7 99.4 93 69.1
RF 86.7 50.7 55.0 80.8 63.5 64.2 86.4 62.2 57.4 95.6 86 53.4
MLP 75.8 56.7 52.7 78.8 57.8 51.1 76.4 58.4 60.0 93.8 95.3 67.4
SVM 76.7 66.7 60.2 85.6 73.9 62.2 85 54.3 66.2 94.4 88.4 55.9
Figure 5: Spectrogram analysis for (left) raw speech, (middle) reconstructed speech preserved speaker identity, and (right)
reconstructed speech with synthetic identity that contains the same speech content
almost negligible rate between the raw and reconstructed speech
signals for this speaker verification task.
Learning these disentangled representations not only serves our
purpose to protect user privacy, but also is useful in finding robust
representations for different speech processing tasks with limited
data in the speech domain [45].
6.2.2 Privacy Estimation.The baseline is the inference success
from unfiltered representations.
PrivacyPreference:High. The output of the framework should
reflect this privacy preference by achieving high accuracy in speech
recognition while hiding a speaker’s identity. Therefore, we mea-
sure the efficiency of the framework to learn a disentangled rep-
resentation that preserves the speech content and discards the
invariant information (i.e. speaker identity, emotion , and gender)
by examining an attacker’s success in obtaining sensitive informa-
tion using this representation. For fair comparison with the baseline
inference accuracy, we only use the quantized embedding before
concatenating it with a synthetic identity during reconstruction.
Figure 6 shows a considerable drop in the inference accuracy after
implementing vector quantization (one technique) to learn such
disentangled representations [78], where the outcome is shown to
be in line with guessing at random for all attacker models.
Privacy Preference: Moderate, The output of the framework
should reflect this preference by achieving high accuracy in speech
recognition while preserving the speaker’s identity. Thus, we mea-
sure the efficiency of the framework to learn a disentangled repre-
sentation that preserves the speech content and speaker identity,
and discards the invariant information (i.e. emotion and gender) by
examining an attacker’s success in obtaining this sensitive informa-
tion using the output of the proposed framework for this preference.
Figure 7 shows a notable reduction in the inference attacks’ accu-
racy after reconstruction. This can be considered as a marginal
improvement on random guessing. When comparing Figure 6 and
Figure 7, we see that the speakers’ representations may still pre-
serve representations related to some sensitive attribute based on
the slight rise in attacker success rate in emotion recognition. More-
over, we notice that the accuracy of gender recognition is higher
in some cases (e.g., RF applied to LibriSpeech and MLP and SVM
applied to IEMOCAP) and even compared to emotion recognition,
which means gender closely related to the speaker’s identity repre-
sentation (i.e. highly related representation), as shown in Table 3.
In future work, we will investigate further disentanglement ap-
proaches (e.g., adversarial learning) within speaker embedding and
add constraints as appropriate to try to limit this success. This could
also be used to address various models used in different speech pro-
cessing applications for extracting acoustic features from raw sig-
nals outperforming one another, e.g. wav2vector (self-supervised)
outperforms DeepSpeech2 (supervised) in speech recognition, as
mentioned in Sec.6.1.2.
6.2.3 Prosody Visualization.Chroma feature (chromagram) is a
fast and robust way to visualize audio attributes, and is relatively
invariant to changes in the vocal tract resonances [79]. This feature
shows the distribution of energy along with the twelve different
pitches or pitch classes, which refer to tones that share the same
pitch-space (refers to tones sounding the same but separated by
relative highness or lowness). To compute this feature, the spectrum
is firstly computed in the logarithmic scale, with a selection of the
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Figure 6: Accuracy in inferring the emotion attribute after implementing the DDF framework with high privacy preference
option (W2V: wav2vector model, DS: DeepSpeech2 model, VQ: Vector Quantization)
Figure 7: Accuracy in inferring the emotion attribute after implementing the DDF framework with moderate privacy prefer-
ence option (W2V: wav2vector model, DS: DeepSpeech2 model, VQ: Vector Quantization)
20 highest dB and restriction to a certain frequency range that
includes an integer number of octaves. Then, the spectrum energy
is redistributed along with the different pitches (i.e., chromas).
Prosodic features, like pitch, play an essential role in the transmis-
sion of vocal emotions [7]. We therefore use chromagram visualiza-
tion to measure the characteristics of the prosodic features between
the raw speech and the reconstructed one. Figure 8 compares the
raw speech (angry emotion), the reconstructed speech with identity
preserved (calm emotion), and the reconstructed speech with sup-
pressed identity. It is clear that the change in the energy located in
each pitch class for each frame reflects the success of the proposed
framework in changing the prosodic representation related to the
user’s emotion to maintain his/her privacy.
7 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
Protecting users’ privacy where speech analysis is concerned
continues to be a particularly challenging task. Yet, our experiments
and findings indicate that it is possible to achieve a fair level of
privacy while maintaining a high level of functionality for speech-
based systems. Our results can be extended to shed light on several
other questions discussed in this section.
To what extent can speech representation be private? Our
experimental evaluation highlights the vulnerability of the under-
lying acoustic models used by the speech processing systems (e.g.
ASR systems) to potential attribute inference attacks. We estimate
an attacker’s success by running various arbitrary classifiers to
measure the extent to which sensitive information can be obtained
from a user’s speech data. Based on the results shown in Table 1,
we find that such an attacker has the opportunity to extract this
information with a much higher degree of accuracy than would
otherwise be possible from chance. For example, for emotion recog-
nition using the Ravdess dataset, and assuming that we have seven
different emotions, then the random assumption rate will be ∼14%
of the time, but when using the logistic model the success rate is
four times greater than this. Moreover, when using, for example,
the SVM model, which is a suggested model for analyzing emo-
tions and physical conditions based on the Amazon patent [35],
we observe that its success rate exceeds random guessing by three
times. Although these classifiers are not ideal and the attackers can
improve their strength by using more robust models (e.g. adversar-
ial classifiers), our work aims to demonstrate these vulnerabilities
and raise the alarm concerning the need for on-device solutions to
sanitize user inputs insofar as possible before sharing them with
service providers.
Is a two-phase framework necessary? The controllability en-
abled by the disentangled representations can help to design new
privacy-preserving applications considering users’ privacy pref-
erences. This controllability will allow us to explicitly adjust the
disentangled representation to match user privacy preferences. We
expect that there are different user privacy preferences for analytics
depending on the service providers with which they interact. For
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Figure 8: Chromagram analysis to measure the change in the prosodic features for emotion recognition for raw speech (left),
reconstructed speech preserving speaker identity (middle), and reconstructed speech with synthetic identity (right)
example, when users communicate with health service providers,
they may prefer to share raw data without any filtering due to the
urgent need to provide accurate information to trusted specialists.
To accommodate such differences, we design a two-phase frame-
work where the first phase captures user preferences, while the
second phase learns disentangled representations to reflect these
preferences.
Initially, we suggest three privacy preferences options (i.e. high,
moderate, and low). Supposing that the user wants to interact with
a smart home assistant such as Amazon’s Alexa or Google Home,
for the high privacy preference option, the default analysis task
should be to understand the user command and response based
on it without any additional information that allows secondary
processing or re-purposing of the user data. For the moderate pri-
vacy preference, the default analysis tasks should be speech-to-text
and speaker recognition for authentication purposes, whereas the
low privacy option allows users to share their data without any
alteration. However, these are just some examples of potential pref-
erences and many more could be included due to the diversity of
these systems users. In future work, we intend to provide users
with additional controls depending on the devices and services with
which they are interacting.
Is disentanglement necessary? Speech data has complex dis-
tributions and contains crucial information beyond linguistic con-
tent that may include information contained in background noise
and speaker characteristics,among other information. Among these
sources of variability, the current training of speech processing
systems without regard to the impact of these sources will affect
its performance and effectiveness. For example, only a portion of
this information is related to ASR, while the rest can be consid-
ered as invariant and therefore impinge upon the performance of
ASR systems. This effect may lead to gender-biased or race-specific
systems [84]. Koenecke et al. in [41] examine the racial disparities
of five state-of-the-art ASR systems developed by Amazon, Apple,
Google, IBM, and Microsoft by transcribing structured interviews
conducted with 42 white speakers and 73 black speakers. They
found that there are disparities in the underlying acoustic mod-
els used by these ASR systems and do not work equally well for
all subgroups of the population. Likewise, the implementation of
disentanglement in learning speaker representations can enhance
the robustness of speaker representations and overcome common
speaker recognition issues like anti-spoofing [65].
Many recent applications have suggested that a disentangled
speech representation can improve the interpretability and trans-
ferability of the representation in the speech signal [30]. Although
these applications seek to improve the quality and effectiveness
of speech processing systems, it has not been considered for use
in protecting privacy. We observe that the ability of the proposed
framework to disentangle these representations can reconstruct
different outputs that reflect a variety of privacy preferences. Thus,
it can be argued that the separation of these representations will
help to develop future privacy-aware solutions between users and
service providers. Moreover, learning disentangled representations
that reflect users’ preferences can bring enhanced robustness, in-
terpretability, and controllability. We will, in future, seek to com-
bine different techniques like adversarial training [32] and Siamese
networks [44] with disentanglement, or add further constraints
grounded in information theory, to improve learning such disen-
tangled representations from users’ signals.
Canwe really do this at the edge?One of the primary reasons
for taking an edge computing approach is to filter data locally prior
to sending it to the cloud. Local filteringmay be used to enhance pro-
tection of users’ privacy. For example, an on-device transformation
of sensor data was proposed by Malekzadeh et al. in [52]. They used
convolutional autoencoders (CAE) as a sensor data anonymizer to
remove user identifiable features locally and then share the filtered
sensor data with specific applications, such as those designed for
daily activities monitoring. In this work, we show how urgent it is
to develop on-device privacy-preserving solutions for voice inputs
by extracting the distinguishing representation from the speech
without compromising individual privacy. In earlier versions of this
work [2], we developed a privacy-preserving filter for voice inputs
on edge devices to protect private paralinguistic information of a
speaker. This filter enables users to protect their sensitive attributes
(e.g. emotion) while benefiting from sharing their voice data with
cloud-based voice analysis services. We implemented and evalu-
ated the on-device filtering approach using a Raspberry Pi 4 as an
example of an edge device, and our experimental results showed
that similar performance in protecting sensitive information is at-
tainable at the edge in comparison with cloud-based approaches.
Although we showed that it is feasible for such models to be run on
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edge devices, further work is required to improve their efficiency,
particularly with regard to model size and execution time. For ex-
ample, model execution on a Raspberry Pi 4 takes twice as long
(∼40 seconds) as the cloud. In this work, our prototype implemen-
tation indicates the effectiveness of the proposed framework in
reconstructing the speech signal. In addition, there is a decrease in
the model size from about 126 MB to 95 MB. As future work, we
aim to significantly reduce the execution time and memory usage
of running the proposed framework on edge devices by further op-
timizing and quantizing the implementation of the model to make
it suitable for use in real-time applications.
8 RELATEDWORK
Privacy Leakage in Deep Learning. Deep learning models
are vulnerable to various inference attacks as they remember infor-
mation about their training data. Unwanted learning in the deep
learning models was indicated by [55, 73], where they demonstrate
that models leak detailed information about their training datasets.
Likewise, in [10], they show that generative text models trained on
sensitive data can memorize its training data and an attacker could
extract unique and secret sequences like credit card numbers given
these models. Song et al. define “overlearning” on deep learning
models to be a model trained for a simple objective that can be
re-purposed for a privacy-violating task in [74]. Motivated by these
previous works, and given the scarcity of works targeting speech
processing models specifically underlying deep acoustic models, in
this paper we demonstrate the privacy leakage of input data from
these models.
Other works have focused on protecting against membership
inference attacks, which aim to determine whether a given data
sample is used in the model’s training [71]. Nasr et al. measure
training data privacy leakage of deep learning algorithms by ana-
lyzing state-of-the-art pre-trained models from the CIFAR dataset
in [59]. They show that even well-generalized deep models are
exposed to white-box membership inference attacks and leak a
significant amount of information about their training data. Investi-
gating membership inference attack is, however, beyond the scope
of this paper but worthy of further investigation. We focus instead
on the scenario whereby attackers can infer a significant amount
of private information by observing the model input even if it is
not in the training data.
Attribute inference attacks have shown to compromise user pri-
vacy in various application domains including recommender sys-
tems [34], side-channel attacks [81], location inference attacks [72],
and property inference attacks [21]. In these attacks, an attacker
aims to infer the private attributes of the target user from his/her
public data. Ateniese et al. show how an attacker can use access to
the parameters of machine learning models such as Hidden Markov
Models (HMM) to extract a predicate of the training data (e.g., the
accent of the speaker in speech recognition models) [4]. In contrast
to their work, we attest that such attacks perform well on the state-
of-art underlying deep acoustic models for speech processing tasks
to extract user-specific private attributes.
Privacy Preserving Speech Representation. Learning pri-
vacy preserved representations in speech data is relatively un-
explored [45]. In [60] Nautsch et al. investigate the importance
of the development of privacy-preserving technologies to protect
speech signals and highlight the importance of the need to apply
these technologies to protect speakers and speech characterization
in recordings. Some recent works have sought to protect speaker
identity [66], gender identity [33] and emotion [2]. VoiceMask, for
example, was proposed to mitigate the security and privacy risks
of voice input on mobile devices by concealing voiceprints [66]. It
aims to strengthen users’ identity privacy by sanitizing the voice
signal received from the microphone and then sending the per-
turbed speech to the voice input apps or the cloud. Moreover, in [2]
an edge-based system is proposed to filter affect patterns from a
user’s voice before sharing it with cloud services for further anal-
ysis. Unlike other approaches, however, we seek to protect the
privacy of multiple user attributes for IoT scenarios that depend
on voice input or speech analysis, i.e. sanitizing the speech signal
of attribute a user may not wish to share but without decreasing
functionality. We also emphasize the importance of learning dis-
entangled speech representation for optimizing the privacy-utility
trade-off and promoting privacy in a transparent manner.
Fairness Representation. Fairness in machine learning is an-
other research area related to this work that shares the same meth-
ods but where the objective is not to protect privacy. It aims to
develop models that are invariant to particular attributes such as
demographic information [50]. In [18] the authors have shown how
the adversarial approach can be adapted to the task of removing
sensitive information from representations. In [57], Moyer et al.
have argued, however, that adversarial training for fairness and
invariance is unnecessary, and sometimes produces counterpro-
ductive effects. Disentanglement has recently been shown to be
useful for learning and evaluating fair machine learning models.
Creager et al. proposed a fair representation learning model by
disentanglement to achieve subgroup fairness in [16]. Similarly, Lo-
catello et al. investigated how disentanglement impacts the fairness
of general-purpose representations in [48]. In [53], disentangling
influence was presented to learn the influence of such attributes in
accomplishing a given task. The authors investigate the importance
of a feature’s influence over the model outcomes taking advantage
of disentangled representations. By contrast, our goal is to protect
user privacy by preventing attackers from obtaining sensitive in-
formation which is significantly different from the motivation and
goals of previous studies.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrated the potential vulnerabilities of
underlying acoustic models used by speech processing tasks under
attribute inference attacks. We proposed a privacy-aware, config-
urable framework for optimizing data sharing through voice user
interfaces. Our proposed framework works in two phases, where
the first phase adjusts privacy preferences and the second filters out
sensitive attributes from users’ input data depending on the con-
figured privacy preference. We based our evaluation on empirical
results derived from numerous real-world datasets, and show that
the proposed framework can effectively defend against this class
of attack. Specifically, we can reduce the success rate of inferring
private attributes to less than or equal to chance, while providing
on average over 99% accuracy in primary tasks.
In the next steps of the work, we intend to focus on extending
our framework to be more tunable to provide users with more
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controls depending on the devices and services with which they are
interacting. An interesting direction for future research is to explore
new privacy-preserving applications that can be enabled by the
interpretability and controllability brought about by disentangled
representations.
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